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Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol established global markets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions
and permits. Such emerging markets will offer challenging opportunities to a wide
variety of different players in industry and commerce. By means of the market-based
Flexible Mechanisms Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism and
International Emissions Trading it will be possible to trade emissions permits globally.
This chapter explores opportunities of the Flexible Mechanisms for industry, including
the financial sector. Moreover, it identifies possible barriers to their realisation. This
analysis is preceded by a discussion of the possible seize of global markets for
emissions permits. In addition, this chapter examines key features of the Flexible
Mechanisms that are relevant from an industry perspective.
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DR JOSEF JANSSEN
1. Introduction
While the previous chapter analysed the incentive to negotiate and adopt agreements to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions at the industry level, this chapter analyses the incentives to reduce
emissions provided by the so-called “Flexible Mechanisms”.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), adopted in December 1997 by more than 150 countries, established global
markets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions.
1 By means of the market-based
Kyoto Mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
International Emissions Trading (IET) it will be possible to trade emissions permits globally.
Demand will be driven by the emissions reduction commitments of industrialised and
transitional countries (the group of Annex B countries).
2 JI and IET enable international trans-
actions of emissions permits among Annex B countries. The CDM allows developing
countries, i.e. non-Annex B countries, to deliver emissions permits to Annex B countries. This
emerging global market, the net value of which is estimated to amount to probably several
$10 billion annually,
3 will offer challenging opportunities to a wide variety of different
players in industry and business.
Will the reluctance of the US administration to ratify the Kyoto Protocol threat the emergence
of such GHG markets? Yes, but only to some extent.
First, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), in its recent third assessment
report, reinforces the need for climate change mitigation. Hence, the issue will not go away.
Moreover, the findings of the IPPC have been reconfirmed by a recent study commissioned
by the Bush administration from the renowned US Academy of Science.
Second, at the national level industrialised countries, especially in Europe, are continuing to
design policies aimed at meeting the Kyoto obligations. In most cases, emissions trading is
envisaged to play an important role. Indeed, in October 2001 the European Commission has
released a proposal for a directive that envisages the establishment of a mandatory CO2
emissions trading system by 2005 for the following sectors and economic activities:
                                                                
1 A general overview of the Kyoto Protocol is Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999) or OECD (1999a).
Barrett (1998) explores the political economy of the Kyoto Protocol. Oberthür and Ott (1999) is a
detailed discussion of political and legal aspects. Kopp and Thatcher (eds) (2000) is a collection of
economic papers on the Kyoto Protocol. Yamin (1998) considers the origins of the Kyoto Protocol and
analyses its key provisions.
2 Throughout this study, to avoid confusion, we refer to Annex B countries (of the Kyoto Protocol),
even if the Kyoto Protocol in some provisions refers to Annex I countries (of the UNFCCC). For
clarification: The Kyoto Protocol prescribes reduction and limitation commitments for Annex I
countries as quantified in Annex B. Both Annexes are almost identical, except for Belarus and Turkey
which are included in Annex I but not in Annex B. The Articles on JI and CDM refer to Annex I
countries, whereas the Article on IET refers to Annex B countries.
3 Springer (2000a) gives a comprehensive overview about market and price estimates. See also Section
3. The aforementioned figure does not cover transactions in domestic markets or within the EU.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (excepting hazardous
or municipal waste installations); mineral oil refineries; coke ovens; production and
processing of ferrous metals including iron and steel; production of cement and lime;
manufacture of glass and ceramic products; pulp and paper. The emissions trading system of
the United Kingdom is to start in April 2002.
Third, any institutional framework that may emerge in alternative to the Kyoto Protocol (what
is, however, not very probable), will heavily rely on market-based instruments such as
(international) emissions trading. Most importantly for the present chapter, international
emissions trading under any alternative institutional framework may expected to resemble the
Kyoto Mechanisms as regards many functional and technical elements. To give an example,
any form of project-based emissions trading will involve the issue of how to determine
baselines, which is a major point in the present debate about the Kyoto Mechanisms.
Moreover, any international market for GHG emissions permits, be it under the Kyoto
Protocol or any alternative framework, may expected to encompass some form of project-
based emissions trading as JI and the CDM represent (see chapter I and section 2 of this
chapter). For this reason, the present analysis of barriers and opportunities associated the
Kyoto Mechanisms is not specifically tied to the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol
but has general validity, even if explicit reference is made to the provisions of the respective
articles of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, such explicit reference does not imply, by no means,
that this chapter becomes irrelevant or completely outdated if in the future the Parties to the
UNFCCC would agree to abandon of the Kyoto Protocol and to search for alternative avenues
for consensus.
Fourth, in anticipation of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, or any other institutional
framework that might emerge as alternative to the Kyoto Protocol, major companies around
the globe from a whole range of industries are taking actions to be prepared for emerging
national and international markets for GHG emissions permits. This group of proactive
companies includes BP, Shell, Transalta, Ontario Power Generation, DuPont, Holderbank and
Swiss Re, to name some of them.
Nonetheless, the reluctance of the new US administration to ratify the Kyoto Protocol may be
a major threat to emerging global markets for GHG emissions permits, if other major GHG
emitting countries abandon their opposition to Bush’s position. In this case, the Kyoto
Protocol may fail to enter into force. It would enter into force if the following conditions were
fulfilled:
§  55 Parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
§  These 55 Parties must include Annex B countries that in 1990 accounted in total for more
than 55% of total CO2 emissions of the group of Annex B countries.
As of 26 October 2001, 43 Parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The sole Annex B
country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol is Romania. It accounts for 1.2% of the CO2
emissions of the group of Annex B countries.
Table 1 shows that the Kyoto Protocol could enter into force also without US ratification.
Ratification by the EU, the countries with economies in transition and Japan would be
insufficient for entry into force. As can be seen from Table 1, it is also necessary for Russia to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Both, Japan and Russia have declared that the Kyoto Protocol has
become ratifiable on the basis of the Marrakech Accords, which have been agreed upon at the
seventh Conference of the Parties (COP7) in November 2001.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Table 1-1. Share of CO2 emissions of Annex B countries
USA 36.1
EU 24.2
Russia 17.4
Japan 8.5
EIT 7.4
Other 6.4
Share of CO2 emissions in 1990 
in % of total Annex I emissions
This chapter aims to discuss main opportunities for industry, including the financial sector,
associated with the Flexible Mechanisms. Furthermore, it identifies major barriers companies
might face in realising such opportunities. To this end, the remainder of this chapter is
organised as follows:
The next section extends the discussion of the nature of the Flexible Mechanisms in chapter I,
adding some aspects which are relevant for industry as their prospective user.
Since it is the aim of the study to explore business opportunities associated with the global
GHG market, it is important to have an idea of its size. Therefore, section three  gives an
overview of the results of different economic models that estimate the potential size of the
global GHG market. Two basic international trading regimes are distinguished: an
international trading regime with unrestricted use of the CDM (global trading), and an
international trading regime that encompasses only trading among Annex B countries. The
latter may be a realistic scenario if the rules on the CDM would have been very restrictive,
which does not seem to be the case after Marrakech. Since prices are the key parameters in
business decisions, the study presents also estimates of permit prices under both regimes.
The fourth section explores opportunities and barriers for GHG emitting industries that are
interested in taking advantage of the Flexible Mechanisms. As regards opportunities, one has
to distinguish between potential buyers and sellers of emissions permits. The former would
benefit from reduced cost of compliance with domestic climate policy regulations. The latter
could take advantage of the Kyoto Mechanisms in order to generate additional profits. Main
barriers discussed include uncertain rules, guidelines, procedures and modalities that will
govern the Kyoto Mechanisms. They are still uncertain since the Marrakech Accords still
need to be implemented at the national level. Other barriers include the lack of incentives at
the national level to use the Flexible Mechanisms, transaction costs and uncertain prices.
Section five explores some functions that financial institutions could perform in emerging
GHG markets, and the last section concludes.
2. Some Additional Key Features of the Kyoto Mechanisms
The nature of the Kyoto Mechanisms has already been discussed to some extent in chapter I
of this report. In this section, I want to explore some additional points regarding the basic
nature of the Kyoto Mechanisms that are relevant for industry as prospective users.
4
To call the Kyoto Mechanisms to the reader’s mind, they encompass the following
instruments:
5
                                                                
4 A more comprehensive discussion of the points raised in this section is provided in Janssen (2001) or
(2000a).JOSEF JANSSEN
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§  Joint Implementation – JI (Article 6 Kyoto Protocol): international transactions of
emissions permits between Annex B countries.
6
§  Clean Development Mechanism – CDM (Article 12 Kyoto Protocol): international
transactions of emissions permits from non-Annex B countries to Annex B countries.
7
§  International Emissions Trading – IET (Article 17 Kyoto Protocol): international
transactions of emissions permits between Annex B countries.
8
What strikes one at first glance is that the Kyoto Protocol provides for two forms of
international mitigation activities among Annex B countries, i.e. JI and IET. Against this
observation, the question arises how JI and IET might be distinguished in essence, and how
they relate to each other.
2.1 Distinguishing JI and IET
In the relevant literature, three main criteria for distinction have been advanced:
§  Private sector versus government participation.
§  Baseline-and-credit versus cap-and-trade or cap-and-allowance trading.
§  International investments versus international trade.
In the following, I will briefly discuss these criteria.
9
Sometimes it had been argued that IET only allows international emissions trading among
governments. If private entities, that is GHG emitting companies, wish to trade GHG
reductions internationally, they would need to use JI. According to this view, the main
criterion for distinguishing IET and JI refers to participants: Regarding IET, only
governments are allowed to participate, whereas JI is also available for private entities.
This perception originate from the language of the respective Articles of the Kyoto Protocol:
Article 6.3 on JI explicitly states that “a Party included in Annex I may authorise legal entities
to participate … in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article
of emissions reduction units”.
10 Article 17, which refers to IET, does not mention explicitly
any private sector involvement. Instead, it only states that “Parties included in Annex B may
participate in emissions trading…”
Several arguments might be advanced against the perception that Article 17 only enables
government-to-government trading: First of all, it is rather unusual that public international
law, as is the Kyoto Protocol, explicitly refers to private sector entities. Hence, the language
of Article 6, referring to legal entities, is rather unusual or abnormal. The non-reference to
private entities of Article 17 is instead the normal case in public international law. And
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 Haites and Aslam (2000); Missfeldt (1998); OECD and IEA (2000a); Petsonk, Dudek and Goffman
(1998) and Skea (1999) provide an overview of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Jepma and Gaast (eds) (1999)
is a collection of various papers on the Kyoto Mechanisms.
6 On JI see e.g. Begg, Jackson and Parkinson (2001) or Jackson, Begg and Parkinson (eds) (2001).
7 The literature on CDM is enormous. An overview of institutional issues is Haites and Yamin (2000).
An extensive treatment of technical, financial and institutional issues is Stewart et al. (2000).
Werksman (1998) explores the conceptual roots of different aspects of the CDM. A useful collection
of papers is Goldemberg (ed.) (1998). See also Michaelowa and Dutschke (eds) (2000).
8 On IET see e.g. IEA (2001); Kerr (ed.) (2000); OECD (1999d); or Tietenberg et al. (1999).
9 A comprehensive discussion with references is provided by Janssen (2001) or (2000a).
10 Emphasis added.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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secondly, the Marrakech Accords explicitly state that legal entities may be authorised to
participate in IET. Concluding, it does not appear to be appropriate to distinguish between JI
and IET by a criterion of allowed participation.
Another criterion for distinguishing JI and IET is the type of emissions trading system to be
governed by JI and IET. As discussed already in chapter I, in the literature on emissions
trading systems, a most important distinction is drawn between cap-and-allowance (or cap-
and-trade) systems and baseline-and-credit systems. In both schemes, the generic term for the
unit of trade is an emissions permit. As indicated already by the names, permits in the former
system are called allowances, whereas credits are earned in the latter. The most prominent
example of a successful cap-and-trade system is the US SO2 trading system.
11
In a baseline-and-credit system, emissions credits are earned if actual project emissions are
below a reference value, or baseline, against reductions are measured. The emissions baseline
in a credit scheme can be identical to the emissions cap in an allowance scheme. However, the
two schemes have different implications regarding the timing and extent of regulatory
involvement: Cap-and-trade schemes, which are comprehensive by their nature, require an
extensive regulatory involvement and hence effort at the beginning to set it up. In contrast,
credit schemes require less initial design and inception effort, but baselines need to be
determined on an individual basis and individual trades must be certified and/or verified by
the regulator. A credit system depends on a project-by-project analysis, whereas an allowance
system depends on an inventory analysis of the regulated entities.
Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and there is considerable dispute
about which system is more efficient and hence more desirable. At present, the parallel
implementation of both systems, cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit, is being considered in
some countries, e.g. in the United Kingdom [DETR (2000); UK Emissions Trading Group
(2000), and chapters I and II]. What is more important in the present context is how JI and
IET might relate to these two systems. Indeed, it may be argued that JI can be regarded as
international baseline-and-credit trading, while IET constitute a form of an international cap-
and-trade system [Janssen (2001) or (2000a)].
Which trading system is more appropriate? It is conceivable that for certain countries, JI is the
more efficient trading institution whereas for other countries transactions under IET are more
efficient. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the countries in transition do not have the
(financial) resources required to set up a comprehensive cap-and-trade system. Hence, it could
be more efficient for them to participate in international emissions trading under JI. Other
countries which value differently the costs associated with setting-up a comprehensive cap-
and-trade system could find it more desirable to opt for this trading institution. Moreover, one
has to distinguish between different GHGs and different sources. It could be true that IET is
more efficient in the context of CO2 emissions from the power sector. Regarding other GHGs
and sources, like methane emissions from agriculture or CO2 emissions from industrial
processes, transactions under JI might be associated with less regulatory set-up or transaction
costs.
Coming to the third criterion, it is frequently argued that JI involves international (equity)
investments: Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack, e.g., states that “JI enables emissions savings …
arising from cross-border investments between Annex B parties to be transferred between
them” [Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999), p. 131]. And “the two project-level mechanisms JI
                                                                
11 On the US SO2 trading system, see for example Burtraw (1999); Ellerman et al. (2000); Joskow,
Schmalensee and Bailey (1998); Klaassen and Nantjes (1997); Montero (1999a); Schmalensee et al.
(1998) or Stavins (1998).JOSEF JANSSEN
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and CDM are intended to use international corporate investment as an engine for the
generation and transfer of emissions credits” [Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999), p. 195]. From
this perspective, another distinction that might be drawn between JI and IET is that the former
represents international production of emissions permits involving international investments
whereas the latter constitute international trade in emissions permits. And it is important to
note that production and trade are two fundamentally different economic activities.
However, in the Kyoto Protocol there is no provision that prescribes that JI must involve
international investments. Hence, it seems to be more convincing to distinguish between JI
and IET according to the criterion  baseline-and-credit versus cap-and-allowances  trading.
International investments are not to be regarded as distinguishing quality of JI projects, but
the  international transaction  of resulting emissions permits. JI projects  may  involve
international investments, but do not require them from a regulatory or legal point of view.
This is illustrated by Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. International permit flows as necessary attribute of JI projects
JI
Annex B Country 1
1 2
3
4 5
Capital Flow Permit Flow
Annex B Country 2
Annex B Country 3
JI projects may involve combinations of the following investment and permit flows: (1;2),
(1;4), (3;2), (3;4), (3;5). On the other hand, international (and national) investments in climate
protection projects the emissions credits of which are sold and used for compliance in the host
country, would not qualify as JI projects. Thus, the combinations of transactions (1;2) or (3;2)
in Figure 2-2 would not be governed by JI.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Figure 2-2. International capital flows as insufficient attribute of JI projects
No
JI
1
2
3
Capital Flow Permit Flow
Annex B Country 1 Annex B Country 2
2.2 CDM as baseline-and-credit trading and the issue of unilateral model
What does the previous discussion imply for the CDM? Regarding the first criterion, the
Kyoto Protocol clearly allows private sector participation. With respect to the second
criterion, the wording of Article 12 on CDM suggests that international GHG transactions
under the CDM would constitute some form of baseline-and-credit trading: Article 12.5(c)
requires that “reductions in emissions … are  additional to any that would occur in the
absence of the certified project activity”. In this wording, the emissions that would occur in
the absence of the certified project activity may be regarded as baseline emissions.
Concerning the criterion international production versus international trade, it is frequently
said that CDM projects involve  international investments, thus constituting  international
production of emissions permits. On the other hand, it is also argued that CDM projects
formally would not necessarily require any foreign investments. Instead, “a host country
could already finance projects on its own and sell credits earned. Article 12 would not prevent
this” [Tietenberg et al. (1999), p. 49]. Such a financing (and trading) model has been referred
to as unilateral model.
In Figure 2-3, it is characterised by the combination of investment and permit flows (1;2).
Under the unilateral model “the developing country would … itself be acting as the main
project investor and would attain the benefits as well as absorb the associated project risks”
[Stewart et al. (1999), p. 28].
12 In such a unilateral model there would be no foreign equity
capital involvement as opposed to the bilateral model which is characterised by international
investments by entities from Annex B countries (see combination (3;4)). On the international
political agenda, the issue of the unilateral model had attracted some attention. It seems that
the Marrakech Accords do not prevent developing countries to apply the unilateral model.
Indeed, it may be expected that the majority of CDM projects will be implemented
unilaterally, since capital formation in most developing countries is financed predominantly
by domestic sources.
                                                                
12 International investments as opposed to international trade are strongly burdened with the risk of
contract breach due to weak international compliance regimes, even if there are instruments for
stabilising international CDM contracts [Janssen (1999a)] and managing associated investment risks
[Janssen (2001) and (2000b)]. However, the possibility to apply the unilateral model could reduce
significantly such political risks.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Figure 2-3: Unilateral and bilateral CDM model
CDM
1 2
3
4
Capital Flow Permit Flow
Non-Annex B Country Annex B Country
2.3 Which type of Kyoto mechanism for international transactions in
greenhouse gas emissions permits?
It seems that JI and CDM would represent some form of international baseline-and-credit
system. In addition, they could involve international investments.
Since international transactions of GHG permits in a baseline-and-credit system between
Annex B countries seem to be governed by JI, it follows that Article 17 on IET would only
apply to international transactions out of a cap-and-trade system. Otherwise, either Article 6
on JI or Article 17 on IET would be redundant due to institutional arbitrage by market
participants.
Emissions permits of all three Kyoto Mechanisms are fungible, at least as regards
international guidelines. As a consequence, all three Kyoto Mechanisms will compete with
each other: Prospective buyers want to achieve compliance at lowest costs. This means that
they will buy those emissions permits that sell at minimum price. Thus, if emissions permits
generated from a CDM project are less expensive than emissions permits available under JI or
IET, prospective buyers will use CDM credits for compliance.
Regarding such a competition between the different Kyoto Mechanisms it is frequently
maintained that CDM projects might involve lower abatement costs as compared to projects
in industrialised countries. On the other hand, it is becoming apparent that CDM projects will
be burdened by more administrative regulations and procedures such as validation,
verification and certification, thus involving higher transaction costs. In addition, from the
perspective of potential investors, CDM projects, being located in developing countries, are
associated with higher political and country risks.
Regarding the level of implementation of emissions trading schemes, one can distinguish
different categories:
§  National/domestic, regional (e.g. EU-wide), and international trading schemes.
§  Intra-firm, inter-firm, firm to government, and government to government emissions
trading.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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All cross-country transactions will be governed by the Kyoto Mechanisms or similar forms of
project-based or inventory-based emissions trading.
Concluding, international transactions related to abatement activities could be classified on
the basis of the following different criteria:
§  Transferring entity is from (1) Annex B country or (2) non-Annex B country.
§  Acquiring entity is from (1) Annex B country or (2) non-Annex B country.
§  Transferring entity has (1) a baseline or (2) operates under a cap.
§  Production of emissions permits involves (1) no international investments or (2)
international investments.
Table 2-1 shows the 16 different transaction types that emerge when combining these criteria.
In the last row an attempt is made to assign the different types of transactions to the three
Kyoto Mechanisms. Even if policy makers, researchers and practitioners might not agree with
this assignment, it would be desirable to be clear about the precise nature of JI, CDM or IET
in terms of transaction types when discussing the Kyoto Mechanisms. This is true as regards
policy-making, research and practice: To design efficient rules and guidelines for JI, CDM
and IET, policy makers should have a clear idea of the nature of underlying transactions. The
same is true for economic research on the Kyoto Mechanisms: In order to analyse, e.g., the
implications of JI, CDM and IET for technology innovation and diffusion, one would
obviously need to have a clear understanding about the economic characteristics of these
concepts. And firms involved in international GHG transactions need to have a clear
understanding about the regulatory framework, in terms of Kyoto Mechanisms, that governs
these transactions.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Table 2-1: Types of international greenhouse gas transactions
Transaction
number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Transaction
features:
Transferring
entity is from
Annex B country X X X X X X X X
Non-Annex B
country X X X X X X X X
Acquiring entity
is from
Annex B country X X X X X X X X
Non-Annex B
country X X X X X X X X
Transferring
entity has a
Baseline X X X X X X X X
Cap X X X X X X X X
Production of
emissions
permits involves
No international
investments
X X X X X X X X
International
investments
X X X X X X X X
Institutional
Framework JI JI IET IET na na na na CDM
u.m.
CDM
b.m. ?? ?? na na na na
n.a. = not available;  u.m. = unilateral model; b.m. = bilateral model.
3. Size of Emerging Global Markets for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits
The Kyoto Mechanisms constitute the instrumental basis of emerging global GHG markets.
Examining opportunities for industry that are associated with these markets, it is interesting to
have a rough idea about their size.
Several economic studies have tried to quantify the costs of reaching the commitments of the
Kyoto Protocol, thereby also focusing on the scope of reducing these costs through the Kyoto
Mechanisms. In this section, I give an overview of the results of these models.
13
                                                                
13 This chapter is based on the excellent survey by Springer (2000a). Another similar market survey is
Edmonds et al. (1999), covering however only some of the models included by Springer (2000a). The
range of models reported in Springer (2000a) covers Integrated Assessment Models, Computable
General Equilibrium Models, Neo-Keynesian Macroeconomic Models, Energy System Models, andKYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Different model types as well as diverging projections of emissions growth without climate
policy (reference case) are the main reasons for the large differences found between the model
results. A common finding of all studies is that trading lowers the costs of achieving the
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. Model results can serve as indicators of the permit prices
and the likely size of the emerging market for GHG permits. However, their limitations and
implicit assumptions should be noted carefully.
14
All models (around 20) discussed by Springer (2000a) share one common finding: Trading
lowers costs substantially. If no emissions trading is allowed, each country has to meet its
reduction obligation on its own. However, for some countries with high carbon efficiency
(like Japan), this would be very expensive. Therefore, autarkic abatement costs without
trading would be very high. Trading allows those countries and industries with lower costs to
reduce more and those with higher costs, to abate less. Of course, the overall reduction is the
same under trading. But overall, costs are substantially lower. This is shown by Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Marginal abatement costs with domestic action only and with
global trading
Model
Marginal abatement costs with domestic
action only
(1998 US$/tonne CO2)
World market
price
(1998
US$/tonne
CO2)
USA Japan EU
EPPA 64 201 94 8
G-Cubed 26 33
53
(other OECD than USA,
Japan, Australia)
7
SGM 51 139 40 8
MS-MRT 91 161 70 10
Sources: Bernstein, Montgomery, Rutherford (1999); Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux (1999);
MacCracken et al. (1999); McKibbin et al. (1999).
The second, third and fourth column show estimates of marginal abatement cost by different
models for the USA, Japan and the EU, respectively, in a situation without international trade.
The last column lists estimates of world market prices with global trading. Such prices would
be equal to marginal abatement cost if global trading is allowed.
At present, several European countries such as the UK, Germany, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland are considering to set up domestic GHG trading schemes. The European
Commission strives for the establishment of an EU-wide trading scheme by 2005. The Danish
trading system is already operational. What would such a European market look like as
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
hybrid models. The market survey by Marenzi and Varilek (2001) also reports data on real
transactions. The results reported here are based on the assumption that the USA would have ratified
the Kyoto Protocol. Recently, some research has started to explore the implications of the withdrawal
of the USA. Hagem and Holtsmark (2001), e.g., predict that permit prices will be reduced to one third
of what it would have been with the USA participating.
14 For a discussion of some model ling issues and main differences between model types see Springer
(2000a).JOSEF JANSSEN
12
regards market prices?Table 3 -2 reports marginal costs if all EU countries would meet
respective Kyoto targets through domestic action only. In addition, this table shows market
prices for different trading scenarios. As can be seen easily, marginal abatement costs for the
EU as a whole could be significantly reduced by opening up internationally an EU wide
trading scheme.
Table 3-2: Marginal abatement costs and market price with and without emissions trading
within the EU
Kyoto
target
Marginal
costs of
domestic
action
Trading scenario
Market
price
EUR 1999 /
tCO2
EUR 1999
/ tCO2
Austria -13 28.4 EU-wide emissions trading among
energy suppliers
32.3
Belgium -7.5 89.3
EU-wide emissions trading among
energy suppliers and energy intensive
sectors
33.3
Denmark -21 47.9 EU-wide emissions trading, all sectors 32.6
Finland 0 63.5 Annex-I-wide emissions trading 17.7
France 0 20.6
Germany -21 13.5
Greece 25 39.0
Ireland 13 53.5
Italy -6.5 33.3
Netherlands -6 150.7
Portugal 27 41.1
Spain 15 27.7
Sweden 4 39.7
United
Kingdom
-12.5 31.9
Source: Capros et al. (2000).
Coming back to the more aggregate international level, Table 3-3  Table 3-3shows permit
prices and net international trade volumes both in physical and value terms estimated by the
models for an international trading regime with unrestricted CDM ( full global trading
scenario).
15
                                                                
15 Full global trading scenario means that developing countries, or non-Annex B countries, can sell
any permits that result from emissions reductions below their business-as-usual scenario. The results
in Table 3-3 are from models that consider only carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Springer (2000a)KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
13
Table 3-3: Prices and net international trade volumes under international trading regime
with unrestricted CDM
Model
Permit price
(1998 US$/tonne
CO2)
Net international
trade volume as
annual average
(million tonnes CO2)
Net international
trade volume as
annual average
(million 1998 US$)
AIM 12 1,833 21,996
ECN 4 2,119 8,476
EPPA 8 3,428 27,424
G-Cubed 7 3,318 23,226
GEM-E3 8 - -
GRAPE 13 1,540 20,020
GREEN 7 2,427 16,989
MERGE 22 - -
MS-MRT 10 - -
POLES 6 2,295 13,770
RICE-98 5 - -
ZEW 13 - -
Average 9.6 2,423 18,843
Median 8.0 2,295 20,020
Sources: Springer (2000a); based on Bernstein et al. (1999); Böhringer (2000); Capros (1999); Criqui
and Viguier (2000); Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux (1999); Kainuma, Matsuoka and Morita
(1999); Kurosawa et al. (1999); Manne and Richels (1999); McKibbin et al. (1999);
Mensbrugghe (1998); Nordhaus and Boyer (1999); Sijm et al. (2000).
Average estimated price is $9.6 per tonne of CO2, which is quite close to the median ($8 per
tonne of CO2). The range of estimated prices is broad, the lowest price is $4; the highest $22
.
16 But this wide price range is not necessarily a problem for decision-makers in affected
industries, since abatement costs of single projects are not continuous but discrete.
Consequently, it may be that known costs of different abatement technologies vary to an even
greater extent than prices indicated above.
Only some models explicitly estimate the amount of permits traded. Average annual net
international trade volumes in physical terms range from 1,540 million tonnes CO2 (GRAPE)
to 3,428 million tonnes (EPPA).
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
also considers models that incorporate emissions of other GHGs, too. Main results are, however, not
affected. None of the models includes terrestrial sinks. Prices reported in dollar values of a different
year are inflated. Trade volumes in physical terms are stated in tonnes of CO2. If necessary, they were
transformed from carbon to CO2 by multiplication with the factor 44/12.
16 The low estimate from ECN is due to the fact that a technology-oriented bottom-up approach was
used which included a considerable potential of options with negative marginal costs.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Estimates about average net international annual trade volume in value terms are much closer
together than estimates about permit prices and trade volumes in physical terms.
17 They range
from $8,476 million to $27,424 million . Under global trading, the average trade volume of all
models is $18,843 million , being very close to the median ($20,020 million).
Under a scenario in which international trading is restricted to Annex B countries, i.e. if the
rules on the CDM are extremely restrictive, all prices are higher and trade volumes in lower
compared to the global trading scenario (see Table 3-4). The results again differ significantly,
the lowest price estimate is $5 per tonne of CO2 and the highest $70.
18 On average, models
predict a price of $24.6 per tonne of CO2, which is close to the median ($18).
Table 3-4: Prices and trade volumes under international trading regime with restricted CDM
Model
Permit Price
(1998 US$/ tonne
CO2)
Trade volume
(million tonnes
CO2)
Trade volume
(million 1998
US$)
AIM 21 1,467 30,807
ECN 5 - -
EPPA 44 1,265 55,660
G-Cubed 18 2,017 36,306
GEM-E3 16 - -
GRAPE 22 1,283 28,226
GREEN 18 1,503 27,054
GTEM 36 - -
MS-MRT 29 1,852 53,708
Oxford 70 1,074 75,180
POLES 17 1,467 24,939
RICE-98 18 - -
WorldScan 6 2,592 15,552
Average 24.6 1,613 38,604
Median 18.0 1,467 30,807
Source: Springer (2000a); based on Bernstein et al. (1999); Bollen, Gielen and Timmer (1999); Capros
(1999); Cooper et al. (1999); Criqui and Viguier (2000); Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux
(1999); Kainuma, Matsuoka and Morita (1999); Kurosawa et al. (1999); McKibbin et al.
(1999); Mensbrugghe (1998); Nordhaus and Boyer (1999); Sijm et al. (2000); Tulpulé et al.
(1999).
                                                                
17 Since low prices lead to more permit trade and vice versa, the products of these two factors exhibit
less variance.
18 The high permit price estimated by the Oxford model can be attributed to the model type: Econo-
metric models are based on estimated values of how imperfect markets react to changes in their
environment. These frictions and imperfections are not included in bottom-up models like ECN, that
report much lower prices.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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As expected, trade volume in physical terms is smaller under international trading regime
with restricted CDM because of the smaller number of potential sellers and a higher permit
price. All models estimate that permit trades would decrease significantly. The average trade
volume in physical terms is 1,613 million tonnes CO2 under Annex B trading, compared to
2,423 million tonnes under global trading.
Interestingly, most models predict a higher trade volume in value terms with restricted than
with unrestricted CDM. The average trade volume in value terms under Annex B trading is
$38,604 million, more than twice as much as under global trading.
Major seller countries under an international trading regime with unrestricted CDM are
China, India and the Russian Federation. Important buyer countries are the European Union,
Japan, and the United States (if the latter would participate in the Kyoto Protocol). Within the
European Union, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands are the largest buyers. In an international
trading regime with restricted CDM, major importing countries are quite the same. On the
supply side, Austria, Eastern Europe, France, Germany and the Russian Federation emerge as
exporters of GHG emissions permits.
Table 3-5 shows that shares of permit imports in total reductions for three major importing
regions, namely the USA (if they would participate in the Kyoto Protocol), the EU, and Japan.
Under an Annex B trading scenario, these regions meet between one and two thirds of their
reductions requirements through imported permits. Obviously, less domestic measures are
undertaken under global trading because permit prices are lower. The estimated shares of im-
ported permits in total reductions are from 50 per cent up to 92 per cent.
Table 3-5: Share of international permit imports on total reductions (%)
International trading regime
World trading Annex B trading
Country USA EU JPN USA EU JPN
Model
ECN 83 59 86 - - -
EPPA 68 76 92 19 35 66
GREEN 50 68 67 29 48 48
POLES 82 78 - 51 52 62
Source: Springer (2000a); based on Burniaux (1998); Criqui and Viguier (2000); Ellerman, Jacoby
and Decaux (1999); Sijm et al. (2000).
Several studies have tried to determine the relative size of international imports under the
CDM as opposed to international transactions among Annex B countries (see Table 3-6).
19
                                                                
19 Model results are for scenarios with no restrictions on any of the Kyoto Mechanisms and
competitive supply. JI/IET includes ‘hot air’ from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Table 3-6: Market share of the CDM
Model /
Author
International Emissions
Trading and Joint
Implementation
CDM
Trade volume Trade volume
(million
tonnes
CO2)
(million
1998
US$)
Market
share
(%)
(million
tonnes
CO2)
(million
1998 US$)
Market
share
(%)
ECN 3,227 3,227 42 4,543 4,543 58
EPPA 774 6,189 23 2,651 21,208 77
G-Cubed 1,503 10,523 45 1,815 12,705 55
GREEN 972 6,802 40 1,456 10,190 60
Haites 1,192 11,920 36 2,108 21,083 64
POLES 986 7,891 38 1,606 12,848 62
SGM 1,309 10,472 44 1,665 13,317 56
Zhang 576 1,727 35 1,071 3,212 65
Source: Springer (2000a); based on Criqui and Viguier (2000); Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux (1999);
Haites (1998); MacCracken et al. (1999); McKibbin et al. (1999); Mensbrugghe (1998);
Sijm et al. (2000); Zhang (2000a).
Estimates of the value of annual permit trade under JI and IET range from $1,727 million
(Zhang) to $11,920 million [Haites (1998)].
20 The market share of these two Kyoto
Mechanisms is expected to lie between a quarter and half of the unrestricted global market for
tradable GHG permits in the first commitment period. Emissions reductions generated under
the CDM have a larger share of the market, estimates range from 55 to 77%. In value terms,
the market volume is between $3,102 and $21,208 million. The market shares could change
due to transaction costs or political restrictions. Political constraints could be placed on the
use of the Kyoto Mechanism by individual countries, for example by not allowing certain
project types under the CDM. Such restrictions could influence the demand for permits of
specific project types.
4. Opportunities and Barriers for Greenhouse Gas Emitting Industries
Key players on both demand and supply side of global GHG markets are GHG emitting
industries. They will benefit from GHG markets by achieving compliance at lower cost or by
producing and selling GHG emissions permits to other companies, thus earning additional
income.
Knowing the GHGs controlled by the Kyoto Protocol, it is straightforward to deduce the
sectors and industries emitting GHG.
21 They include [Watson, Zinyowera and Moss (eds.)
(1996), part III]:
                                                                
20 Because the models represent emissions trading among regions, they cannot distinguish between the
Kyoto Mechanisms JI and IET.
21 The Kyoto Protocol controls the following GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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§  Production of natural gas and hydrocarbon oil;
22
§  coal mining;
§  transmission and distribution of natural gas;
§  refining of hydrocarbon oil and petrochemistry;
§  power production based on fossil fuels;
23
§  production of basic metals including iron and steel, aluminium and copper;
24
§  chemical industry;
§  pulp and paper production;
§  production of construction materials including cement and concrete, brick and glass;
25
§  fossil fuel based transportation;
§  fossil fuel consumption in residential and commercial buildings;
§  waste and wastewater disposal;
§  agriculture and forestry.
Depending on the comparative cost advantage of individual firms operating in these
industries, they will be potential buyers or sellers of emissions permits. In the following, I will
explore potential opportunities and barriers existing on the demand and supply side.
4.1 Opportunities and barriers for greenhouse gas emitting industries: Demand
side
All sectors and industries in Annex B countries which are emitting GHGs controlled by the
Kyoto Protocol will potentially be on the demand side. It is important to note that these
industries are only potentially on the demand side. This is for several reasons.
First, some governments may decide to regulate only  certain GHG emitting industries by
climate policies. Experience in recent energy and environmental taxation initiatives in several
European countries indicate that governments tend to exempt energy intensive and export
oriented industries from taxation [Ekins and Speck (1999) or Hanisch (1998)]. Here is not the
place to discuss the efficiency or possible political economy explanations of such policy
approaches. However, they make evident that it cannot necessarily be expected that the in-
tensity of climate policy regulations will coincide with the GHG emissions quantities of
different industries.
Second, climate policy regulations may be implemented at various stages of the production
cycle: The literature distinguishes between upstream and downstream regulation.
26 The
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Milich (1999) discusses in detail economic activities resulting in emissions of methane. OECD (2000)
provides a survey of economic activities resulting in emissions of non-CO2 GHGs.
22 See Janssen (1999b) for a discussion of applying the Kyoto Mechanisms at the production stage of
oil and gas.
23 On applying the Kyoto Mechanisms in the power sector see OECD and IEA (2000b), chapter 3.
24 On applying the Kyoto Mechanisms in the iron and steel industry see OECD and IEA (2000b),
chapter 5.
25 Regarding the potential to reduce GHG emissions in the cement industry, see e.g. Soares and
Tolmasquim (2000) or Worrell, Martin and Price (2000). On applying the Kyoto Mechanisms in the
cement industry see Jansen and Vleuten (1995) and OECD and IEA (2000b), chapter 2.JOSEF JANSSEN
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former refers to policies that aim at restricting the carbon input to the economy. They address
producers and importers of primary energy like natural gas, coal and oil. The latter aim at
directly regulating  final emitters of GHGs like power plants, and households and firms that
use fossil fuels for heating and transportation. Both approaches can be designed effectively.
But from an economic perspective, they are not necessarily equivalent, since they may
involve different price signals and transaction costs. In any case, it will depend on the
concrete policy approaches adopted in Annex B countries, if upstream industries like oil &
gas companies or downstream emitters like power producers and processing industries
represent the major groups of final buyers of GHG permits.
Third, some regulated industries and companies might be able to reduce emissions internally
at marginal abatement costs that are lower than present or future market prices for GHG
emissions permits. In this case, it is economically rational to reduce GHG emissions at
regulated sources instead of buying emissions permits on national or international markets.
27
Fourth, the potential to take advantage of the Kyoto Mechanisms will also depend on the size
of the firm in question. Most companies outside the USA are not familiar with emissions
trading schemes and the Kyoto Mechanisms. Thus, many firms would need to build up
relevant expertise and know how. This is true even more in the case of the Kyoto
Mechanisms, the application of which may be expected to be more complicated than purely
national transactions. Now, such investments in required human capital, infrastructure and
networks involve additional costs which, to a large extent, are fixed. Such fixed costs may
prevent small and medium sized enterprises from the outset to develop a compliance strategy
based on the Kyoto Mechanisms. The same considerations apply on the supply side.
Presently, some state governments in Germany, e.g. in Baden-Württemberg, are trying to
promote involvement of medium sized companies in the Kyoto Mechanisms by supporting
capacity building initiatives.
4.1.1 Opportunities on the demand side
Opportunities of the Kyoto Mechanisms are straight forward for GHG emitting companies
which potentially are on the demand side of global GHG markets: If they are regulated by
domestic climate policies, and if they are faced with relatively high internal abatement cost,
they could reduce costs of compliance by means of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Such a
minimisation of compliance costs constitutes a most significant opportunity of the Kyoto
Mechanisms for GHG emitting firms. Figure 4-1 illustrates this point, assuming that a GHG
emitting firm is regulated by a domestic tradable permit system.
The company in question has an initial allocation of emissions permits equal to EP. Its original
emissions are E0. At the end of the compliance period, e.g. at the end of one year, the firm
must hold emissions permits equal to its actual emissions in order to be in compliance. For the
first emissions reduction units, it is cheaper to abate internally than to buy emissions permits
at price P. Consequently, the firm reduces emissions internally up to that amount where
marginal abatement costs equal the market price of emissions permits (E1). In order to be in
compliance, the firm could continue to reduce emissions internally or just buy emissions
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
26 On a discussion of the different systems in the context of emissions trading see e.g. Australian
Greenhouse Office (1999a); CCAP (1998a) and (1998b); Heinz Center (1998) or TPWG (2000).
27 It might indeed by expected that to some extent companies and industries might find it cheaper to
reduce emissions at regulated sources. The survey by Springer (2000a) reveals that Annex B countries
will meet their Kyoto targets to a significant extent through domestic action. Some energy experts also
argue that there exist a wide range of no-regret or no-cost options to reduce GHG emissions.
Regarding the debate on no-regret options see e.g. Sutherland (2000).KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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permits on national or international markets, the latter through the Kyoto Mechanisms. Since
any further internal reduction would be more expensive than purchasing emissions permits at
price P, a cost minimising firm would buy emissions permits in a quantity equal to the
difference (E1 - EP). If no trading were allowed, it had to reduce emissions internally up to E P.
Cost savings achieved through emissions trading amount to the area (ABC).
Figure 4-1: Economic benefit of Kyoto Mechanisms: demand side
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Cost savings associated with the Kyoto Mechanisms are expected to be even higher than those
obtained through domestic emissions trading (see above). These compliance cost savings
associated with the Kyoto Mechanisms represent the main opportunity for GHG emitting
companies that are regulated by climate policies and that face comparatively high abatement
costs. And all economic studies on the costs of Kyoto indicated that potential costs savings
would be huge (see Section 3).
4.1.2 Barriers on the demand side
Opportunities of the Kyoto Mechanisms are straightforward. However, companies may face
significant barriers that might prevent them from realising these opportunities.
For analytical clarity, it is useful to distinguish between barriers associated with the market
itself, and barriers induced by regulatory restrictions at the international and national level.
§  Market barriers: price uncertainties and liquidity risks.
§  Regulatory barriers imposed by international rules: import restrictions, levies on
transactions and eligibility requirements for countries.
§  Regulatory barriers at the national level: low compatibility of domestic regulations with
the Kyoto Mechanisms and lack of incentives for legal entities to engage in the Kyoto
Mechanisms.
4.1.3 Price uncertainties
The discussion of section 3 has shown, that future prices of emissions permits are quite
uncertain, estimates ranging from $4 to $22 per tonne of CO2 equivalents under an
international trading regime with unrestricted CDM, and from $5 to $70 under an
international trading regime with very restrictive rules on the CDM. On average, modelsJOSEF JANSSEN
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discussed in section 3 predict a price of approximately $10 and $25 per tonne of CO2
equivalents for both regimes, respectively. Experience with the US SO2 emissions trading
system indicates that future prices might be significantly overstated [Schmalensee et al.
(1998)].
28 Costs of internal emissions reduction programmes may appear to be more certain.
Consequently, regulated companies that are faced with the need to develop compliance
strategies may regard these price uncertainties as obstacles that prevent them from using the
Kyoto Mechanisms.
However, it is quite probable that tools for hedging such price risks will emerge, as has been
the case in other (emission) markets. Such risk management tools encompass forward and
future contracts, call and put options, swaps and others. It may be expected that financial
institutions will enter this market and offer such derivative instruments.
29
4.1.4 Liquidity risks
Liquidity risks are a major obstacle for emissions trading. Low (expected) liquidity of
emissions markets is generally considered to be one of the most important reasons for their
failure: If potential buyers anticipate that it could be very difficult or even impossible to
purchase emissions permits required to get into compliance, they might adopt a compliance
strategy of internal emissions abatement from the outset. In addition, low liquidity will
increase search costs associated with finding an interested seller, thus raising barriers to
trade.
30 Search costs will increase directly or indirectly, depending on the arrangement of
trades. If trades are arranged bilaterally between buyer and seller, the buyer will need more
time and money to find a counterparty. If they are mediated through a broker, increases in
search costs will be reflected in higher brokerage fees.
Liquidity risk may be mitigated if national markets are integrated at the international level.
4.1.5 Import restrictions
Closely linked to liquidity risks are barriers created by import restrictions. Why import
restrictions? The text of the Kyoto Protocol on JI, CDM and IET requires that
“the acquisition of emissions reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the
purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3”,
“Parties included in Annex B may use the certified emissions reductions ... to contribute to
compliance with  part of their quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments
under Article 3”, and
“any such trading shall be  supplemental  to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting
quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments ...”.
31
These provisions are also called supplementarity provisions. The European Union, supported
by some developing countries, had been strongly advocating to define such supplementarity
in quantitative terms. Quantitative restrictions on the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms
(“ceiling”) would constitute import quotas for emissions permits, rising the domestic price of
                                                                
28 For a detailed analysis of possible explanations of this empirical fact see Montero (1999b).
29 On the use of derivative instruments in emissions markets see e.g. Bailey (1998); Byrd and Zwirlein
(1994); ETEI (1999) and Tucker (2001).
30 Liski (2001) provides a theoretical analysis of GHG market liquidity and transaction costs.
31 Article 6.1(d), Article 12.3(b), and Article 17, respectively. Emphasis added.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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emissions permits.
32 From the perspective of potential buyers, such import restrictions, if
expected to be binding, constitute additional barriers. First, permit buyers will need to pay
higher prices as compared to a situation without ceiling. Second, import quotas involve
additional information costs for importers associated with required learning effort about their
administration. Third, if rationing is implemented on the basis of a first-come, first-served
approach, such a ceiling could jeopardise liquidity of the market at an increasing rate, thus
involving risks of non-compliance and associated financial penalties for companies counting
on the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Anticipating such risks, potential buyers will be
reluctant to rely on the Kyoto Mechanisms.
At COP7, Parties agreed that there will be no obligation to impose quantitative restrictions on
the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms. However, some countries might still wish to do so.
33
4.1.6 Levies on transactions
Article 12.8 on the CDM states that “a share of proceeds from certified project activities is
used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of
adaptation”. This provision constitutes the basis for a levy on transactions under the CDM.
At COP7, Parties have decided that the share of proceeds for adaptation measures shall be 2%
of the CERs issued for a CDM project activity.
34 The level of the share of proceeds to cover
administrative expenses of the CDM shall be determined at a later stage. From the perspective
of potential buyers, such transaction fees on the CDM increase the barriers to its use.
4.1.7 Eligibility requirements for countries
Some countries may not be eligible to acquire emissions permits from other countries.
According to the agreement reached at COP7, countries that want to acquire emissions
permits for compliance must meet the following criteria:
§  It is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.
§  It has established its assigned amount.
§  It has in place a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic GHG emissions and
removals.
§  It has in place a national registry for emissions permits.
§  It has submitted the most recent required inventory.
If a country fails to meet these obligations, companies in that country intending to buy
emissions permits through the Kyoto Mechanisms may be disallowed to use such permits for
compliance.
4.1.8 Possible incompatibility of domestic regulations with the Kyoto Mechanisms
This issue involves two aspects: First, crediting procedures could involve high transaction
costs due to technical or institutional reasons. Some domestic climate policy instruments
                                                                
32 Bernstein et al. (1999); Bollen, Gielen and Timmer (1999); Ellerman and Wing (2000); Gusbin et al.
(1999); Ybema, Kram and Rooijen (1999) and Zhang (2000b) provide an economic analysis.
33 An example is Switzerland that despite the agreement reached at COP7 intends to limit
quantitatively the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms [Janssen and Springer (2001)].
34 CDM projects in least developed countries will be exempt from this share of proceeds.JOSEF JANSSEN
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might simply not be compatible with the Kyoto Mechanisms in terms of providing incentives
for their use (see also chapters I and II regarding compatibility of the Kyoto Mechanisms with
domestic climate policies). Second, domestic climate policy regulations may simply not allow
the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms for compliance.
Concerning the first point, different domestic climate policy instruments involve different
transactions costs in terms of using the Kyoto Mechanisms for compliance. In general,
governments of Annex B countries can induce their economies to reduce GHG emissions by
means of different climate policy instruments.
35 They include [OECD (1999b)]:
§  regulatory standards, e.g. energy efficiency standards, automobile fuel efficiency,
renewable energy quotas;
36
§  emissions and carbon taxes and charges;
37
§  environmental subsidies;
§  domestic tradable permits;
38
§  voluntary agreements (see chapter II);
§  green government purchasing; and
§  removal of fossil energy subsidies.
The different policy instruments do not have the same degree of compatibility with the Kyoto
Mechanisms in terms of technical feasibility and transaction costs.
39 Domestic cap-and-
allowances trading systems and carbon taxes are easy to combine with the Kyoto
Mechanisms. Voluntary agreements may be compatible with the Kyoto Mechanisms, if the
consequences of agreed actions can be directly expressed in terms of tonnes of GHG
emissions. The same consideration applies in the case of regulatory standards [Haites and
Aslam (2000), pp. 27-28]. Transaction costs associated with using the Kyoto Mechanisms for
compliance with domestic climate policies will generally increase if such policies define
relative or intensity targets as opposed to absolute targets.
Regarding the second point, governments of Annex B countries are free to decide that
regulated firms within their jurisdiction are not allowed to comply (with part of) their
                                                                
35 Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol gives Annex B countries high flexibility in the choice of domestic
climate policies. Gummer and Moreland (2000) provides an overview on national climate policy
programmes in the European Union.
36 Helfand (1991) gives an overview of different modes of defining standards and explores their
economic properties. On emerging renewable energy quotas see Berry and Jaccard (2001); Drillisch
(2000); EURELECTRIC (2000); Morthorst (2000) or Schaeffer et al. (1999).
37 On carbon taxes see e.g. Baranzini, Goldemberg and Speck (2000). On the potential for using taxes
to reduce non-CO2 GHG see OECD (2000).
38 On the design of domestic emissions trading markets see e.g. Australian Greenhouse Office (1999a);
(1999b); (1999c) and (1999d); Hinchy, Fisher and Graham (1998); Ministry of Environment of New
Zealand (1998) and TPWG (2000).
39 See e.g. Hahn and Stavins (1999); Haites and Aslam (2000); Michaelowa (1996) for a general
discussion. On the compatibility of tradable renewable energy quotas and GHG emissions trading see
Morthorst (2001). On the interaction between the European directive on integrated pollution
prevention and control (IPPC), which prescribes the use of best available technologies, and emissions
trading see Smith and Sorrell (2000).KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
23
commitments by means of the Kyoto Mechanisms, e.g. in order to achieve local
environmental objectives.
40
4.2 Opportunities and barriers for greenhouse gas emitting industries: Supply
side
4.2.1 Opportunities on the supply side
All sectors and industries that are on the demand side, are potentially also on the supply side,
depending on their comparative advantage in reducing GHG emissions. In concrete, those
companies which accomplish to generate surplus GHG emissions reductions at marginal costs
that are below the governing world market price for GHG permits, will potentially be on the
supply side.
41 This point is illustrated by Figure 4-2, assuming that a GHG emitting firm is
regulated by a domestic tradable permit system. The company in question has an initial
allocation of emissions permits equal to E P. Its original emissions are E 0. At the end of the
compliance period, e.g. at the end of one year, the firm must hold emissions permits equal to
its actual emissions in order to be in compliance. For the company considered, it is easy to
reduce its emissions to an amount that equals its initial allocation of emissions permits (EP).
The company is now in compliance. But it could reduce emissions even further at relatively
low costs. It is profitable to reduces emissions up to that amount where marginal abatement
costs equal the market price of emissions permits (E1). The surplus emissions reductions (EP -
E1) can be sold on national or international markets, thereby making a profit that corresponds
to the area (ABC).
Sales on international markets would occur under one of the Kyoto Mechanisms, depending
on the location of the permit producing entity (Annex B versus non-Annex B country) and the
climate policy instrument by which it is regulated.
42 Thus, companies in GHG emitting
industries may take advantage of the Kyoto Mechanisms to realise additional business
opportunities.
A general question is, how to determine surplus emissions. In order to answer this question, it
is useful to distinguish between two situations: If a company or a plant is regulated by a cap-
and-allowance system, surplus emissions are any positive difference between holdings of
emissions permits and actual emissions (see above). Under any other climate policy
regulation, an emissions surplus is any emissions reduction below a certain reference scenario
or baseline.
43
In addition to having the potential to generate surplus emissions permits at competitive costs,
firms need to be allowed by national and international law to trade possible surplus reductions
internationally. I will discuss this point under the heading barriers.
In conclusion, the emerging global GHG market will enable companies in GHG emitting
industries to make additional profits through the production and subsequent sale of surplus
emissions permits. As the discussion in section 3 has shown, business opportunities associated
with the by-product emissions permits are deemed to be quite large.
                                                                
40 Obviously, such a policy approach would only be second or third best. A first best policy would try
to tackle a given policy objective with a more targeted instrument.
41 Contrary to frequent perceptions, surplus reductions are not necessarily tied to specific technologies.
They are always case-specific.
42 The latter determines whether the company participates in emissions trading under a cap-and-trade
or baseline-and-credit system, see above.
43 On baselines see section 2.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Figure 4-2: Economic benefit of Kyoto Mechanisms: supply side
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4.2.2 Barriers on the supply side
Business opportunities on the supply side of the global GHG market are expected to be huge.
However, firms that have the potential to deliver emissions permits at competitive costs to the
market, may be prevented from doing so due to the existence of different kinds of barriers. As
on the demand side, they may be classified into different categories:
•  Market barriers: price uncertainties and liquidity risks.
•  Regulatory barriers imposed by international rules: levies on transactions, eligibility
requirements for countries, transaction costs associated with baseline determination etc.
•  Regulatory barriers at the national level: transaction costs and complicated procedures
associated with exports.
Barriers on the supply side are quite similar in their nature to those pertinent to the demand
side (see above). Consequently, I will touch only on some additional or different aspects.
4.2.3 Price uncertainties and liquidity risks
Here, similar considerations apply as those mentioned in the context of the demand side.
4.2.4 Levies on transactions
Levies on transactions, as discussed before in the context of barriers related to the demand
side, will also affect the supply side.
4.2.5 Country eligibility
Regarding JI and IET, the same country eligibility criteria apply for transfers as for
acquisitions of emissions permits (see above). In case a country has not in place a national
registry, emissions reductions to be transferred under JI need to be verified by an independent
entity under the supervision by the JI supervisory committee.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Host countries of CDM projects are eligible to transfer CERs if they have ratified the Kyoto
Protocol and if it has designated a national authority for the CDM.
4.2.6 Transaction costs involved with baseline determination, verification and
certification
Prospective sellers of emissions permits to be generated through JI or CDM projects need to
determine emissions baselines of such projects. Article 6.1(b) on JI states “any such project
provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is
additional to any that would otherwise occur”. Article on 12.5(c) on CDM requires that
“reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the
certified project activity”. Those emissions that would otherwise occur or that would occur in
the absence of the certified project activity are the baseline emissions.
Several approaches for baseline determination of JI and CDM projects are under discussion.
44
At COP7, an agreement has been reached on some guidelines for baseline determination. In
any case, baseline determination brings about considerable costs that constitute barriers to the
implementation of JI and CDM projects.
CDM projects need to be validated, verified and certified. JI projects require verification, and
possibly also validation. In any case, associated fees of accredited companies that perform
these tasks will increase transactions costs. In order to reduce validation, verification and
certification fees at a minimum, it is important to establish accreditation procedures that
promotes intensive competition among these service suppliers.
4.2.7 Domestic climate policies may not allow the export of emissions permits
Governments of Annex B countries are free to decide if companies within their jurisdiction
are allowed to export emissions permits to other countries.
5. Opportunities for Financial Institutions
Financing and risk management are important functions performed by financial institutions
like banks and insurance companies. The supply of optimised financial products and services
is essential for the efficiency of markets. Emerging GHG markets represent challenging new
opportunities for financial institutions to supply innovative financial products and services
that are tailored at the needs of market participants. In the following, I will highlight some
areas that appear to be particularly interesting. They include project finance, carbon
investment funds and insurance.
In the past, the role of financial institutions in contributing to implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Kyoto Mechanisms has rarely been explored. Discussion has centred on the
issue of how financial institutions could contribute to sustainable development in general.
With regard to climate change and financial institutions, discussion has predominantly been
directed towards the question of how climate change might impact financial institutions, and
of how financial institutions could adapt to climate change impacts [Berz (1997); Dlugolecki
(1996); Knoepfel et al. (1999); Leggett (ed.) (1996); Tol (1996); Tucker (1997)]. An
                                                                
44 Ellis (1999); Ellis and Bosi (1999); OECD (1999c); OECD and IEA (2000b); Parkinson et al.
(2001); Sugiyama and Michaelowa (2001); or Willems (2000). Janssen (2001) and (2000b) argues that
from the perspective of risk management it makes an important difference if baselines are defined in
terms of (relative) emissions intensities or rates, or in terms of absolute emissions levels.JOSEF JANSSEN
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exception is Janssen (2000b) and (2001) who discusses some functions financial institutions
could perform to facilitate use of the Kyoto Mechanisms.
45
In advance of the academic debate, several major private-sector financial institutions like
Crédit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank, Sanpaolo Imi, Société Générale, SwissRe, among others,
are already designing new financial products and services targeted at the needs of corporate
clients that wish to take advantage of the Kyoto Mechanisms and GHG emissions trading.
Against this observation it is interesting to explore how banks and insurance companies could
contribute to the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms and GHG emissions trading, thus facilitating
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This section discusses the role of carbon
investment funds set up by financial institutions and explores the possible role of insurance in
emerging GHG markets.
5.1 Carbon investment funds
5.1.1 Introduction
Emissions trading generally induces investments in abatement activities. In the case of JI and
CDM, which represent post-verification or project-based trading, emissions permits are
generated only if abatement activities reduce project emissions below baseline emissions. In
cap-and-allowance trading systems, the transfer of emissions permits does not require
abatement activities to be undertaken ex ante. Still, unless the initial allocation of emissions
permits exceeds business-as-usual emissions, the transferring party needs to abate emissions
within the relevant compliance period in order to be in compliance. As a consequence, the
sale of emissions permits requires investments in abatement activities at some point in time.
As with all kinds of investments, the willingness of private-sector companies to invest in
commercial GHG reduction projects (defined as climate protection projects that generate
marketable emissions permits) will depend on respective risk-return profiles. Commercial
climate protection projects represent attractive investment opportunities only if financial risks
associated with required investments are not too high. One classical instrument to reduce
investment risks is risk diversification through efficient portfolio construction.
This subsection aims to discuss how specific risks associated with JI and CDM investments
may be managed by taking advantage of portfolio diversification and carbon investment
funds. To this end, I will first identify sources of investment risks associated with JI and CDM
projects. Starting point of risk analysis is the net present value (NPV) of JI and CDM
investments. A distinction is made between price and quantity risks. My analysis is limited to
project-based emissions trading, i.e. JI and CDM, for several reasons. First, it helps to keep
the analysis relatively simple and focused. Second, most insights gained may be easily
extended to cap-and-allowance trading systems. After having identified specific risks
associated with JI and CDM investments, I will discuss from a conceptual angle the potential
of risk diversification. The concluding part of this subsection will analyse how risk
diversification could be achieved by taking advantage of indirect investment vehicles like
carbon funds. In addition, it describes some carbon investment funds that are emerging in
practice, including the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund.
                                                                
45 Whitmore (2000) is another but rather curious exception. He argues that compulsory liability
insurance for damages caused by emitting GHGs could be a feasible and efficient instrument for
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5.1.2 Identifying investment risks of JI and CDM Projects
JI and CDM projects aim at producing emissions credits for subsequent sale on international
markets or for transfer to the project sponsor. In both cases, the value of such investments is
affected by different kinds of risk.
To identify the different risk sources that could affect the value of JI/CDM projects, it is
useful to distinguish between different sources of uncertainty:
§  Technological risks are tied to the process of production. They refer to uncertain output
quantities. In the present context, technological risks involve uncertain quantities of
emissions reductions achieved.
§  Economic risks depend on uncertainties generated by markets and refer to uncertain input
and output prices.
§  Political  risks refer to uncertainty over property rights. Political risks may involve
currency control, unexpected changes in tax laws or regulation, or expropriation in the
extreme case.
Net present value of JI and CDM investments as starting point of risk analysis
From the investor’s perspective the value of a JI/CDM project may be measured by the NPV
of the project considered. Investment risks of JI/CDM projects refer to a risky NPV of such
projects. Thus, in order to analyse investment risks of JI/CDM projects, one needs to explore
the main elements of their NPV.
In a simple form, the NPV of investment projects is defined as the difference between the
discounted cash inflow and the discounted cash outflow associated with the project over its
economic lifetime. The discount rate is also called hurdle rate or opportunity cost of capital. It
should be equal to the rate of return offered by comparable investment alternatives. It is called
the opportunity cost of capital because it is the return foregone by investing in this project
rather than investing in the next best investment opportunity. In principle there can be a
different discount rate for each future period. In the simple discounted cash flow formula, it is
assumed that the discount rate is the same regardless of the date of the cash flow.
Concerning the decision to invest in a project, the investor should apply the NPV rule.
According to this investment decision rule, investment projects should be accepted if they
have a positive NPV. In a situation of uncertainty, it may be appropriate to expand the
discounted cash flow in order to take properly into account possible real options embedded in
different investment alternatives or project designs [Teisberg (1995); Trigeorgis (ed.) (1995)].
Real option values reflect the value of flexibility to adapt and revise later decisions in
response to unexpected developments. Despite the relevance of real option theory, it is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
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These basic investment considerations may also be applied in the context of JI/CDM projects.
The main challenge is to define costs and revenues appropriately. Generally, the NPV of
investments in JI/CDM projects may be stated as
( ) 0 1
T
tt
t
t
RC
NPV
r =
-
=
+ ￿ (0.1)
where
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t R   denotes the revenue of the JI/CDM project in period t,
t C   are the costs of the JI/CDM project in period  t, composed of abatement
and transaction costs,
r is the discount rate and
T   denotes the crediting lifetime of the JI/CDM project.
The remainder of the present part of this subsection will discuss the different components and
associated risk factors of the NPV of JI/CDM projects. Due to space restrictions I will discuss
only some risk sources. For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis the reader is referred
to Janssen (2001).
Revenue side
The revenue  t R  of JI/CDM project investments is composed of
ttt RpEP =￿ (0.2)
where
t p   is the unit value or price of emissions credits and
t EP   is the amount of emissions credits or permits generated by the project in
question.
The amount of emissions credits generated by JI/CDM investments is defined as the
difference between baseline emissions and actual GHG emissions of the project. Various
approaches for baseline determination of JI/CDM projects are available.
Several ways to classify baseline approaches have been proposed. One common
classification, which is based on criteria of aggregation and standardisation of baseline
setting, distinguishes between the following types [Ellis and Bosi (1999); OECD and IEA
(2000b)]:
§  Project-specific baselines,
§  multi-project baselines and
§  hybrid baselines.
Project-specific baselines apply to one project only. They are the least aggregate type. These
baselines are drawn up by using project-specific assumptions, measurements, comparisons,
estimates or simulations for all key parameter.
Multi-project baselines are defined and applied to multiple projects of a similar type. They
aim to standardise emissions levels and rates or intensities. They are more aggregated than
project-specific baselines, but there may be various levels of aggregation such as by
technology, sector, country or region. Multi-project baselines correspond to an activity
standard or policy target that is aggregated at a certain level. For example, baseline emissions
for a new or refurbished power plant could be specified on the basis of the average or
marginal emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced in the country or region. At a
more disaggregated level, baseline emissions of such a project could be established byKYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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determining the average or marginal emissions per kilowatt-hour of the technology to be
applied in this project.
Under the hybrid approach, baselines are determined in a hybrid fashion, with some key
components or methodologies project-specific, and others standardised.
In the present context it is useful to look at baselines from the angle of uncertainty involved
for the investor. To this end it is constructive to distinguish between baselines based on
emissions levels versus baselines defined in terms of emissions intensities or rates, e.g. as
tonnes of CO2 emissions per kilowatt-hour (see below).
Actual emissions are generally determined by the activity level multiplied by a corresponding
emissions factor [Houghton et al. (eds.) (1997)]. To give an example, process-related CO2
emissions from cement production are determined by multiplying the output of cement
produced (measured in tonnes) by the emissions factor 0.4985.
After having discussed the two major determinants of the amount of emissions credits earned
by JI/CDM projects, it is possible to have a closer look at quantity risks. In case baselines are
defined in absolute terms, the quantity of emissions credits earned per period is defined as
absolutebpbbpp
ttttttt EPEEexex =-=￿-￿ (0.3)
where
absolute
t EP   are the emissions credits earned in period  t in case the baseline
is defined in absolute terms, i.e. tonnes of CO2,
b
t E   are the absolute baseline emissions in period  t, measured in
tonnes of CO2,
p
t E   are the absolute project emissions in period t,
b
t e   is the baseline emissions rate, e.g. tonnes of CO2 per kilowatt-
hour,
p
t e   is the actual emissions intensity or rate of the project,
b
t x   is the baseline level of the activity to which the baseline
emissions rate refers, e.g. kilowatt-hours and
p
t x   is the actual project level of the activity to which the baseline
emissions rate refers.JOSEF JANSSEN
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This is a reduced formula for calculating emissions credits earned by JI/CDM projects that
does not make explicit all parameters and technical relations that would be used in an
engineering approach.
47 However, for the present purpose such a reduced form is sufficient.
As can be seen easily, the following factors can lead to uncertainty about the quantities of
emissions credits actually earned:
¤ 
b
t E : Baselines of ongoing projects may need to be adjusted unexpectedly. This is,
however, not foreseen by the guidelines agreed upon at COP7.
¤ 
p
t e : The actual emissions intensity of the project may deviate from expected values due
to technological under-performance (or over-performance) of the mitigation
technology employed.
¤ 
p
t x
: The actual level of the activity to which the emissions rate refers may deviate
from the projected level: A power plant may produce less power than projected
due to unexpected low demand for power or business interruption.
The last risk factor is particularly interesting, since economic activities associated with GHG
emissions, e.g. power generation or cement production, generally exhibit high fluctuations.
Such variability will have a significant impact on the amount of emissions credits earned by
JI/CDM projects. Will such variances be positively or negatively correlated? This question
may be answered by taking the first derivative of the amount of emissions credits earned with
respect to the activity level. Since in the above formula this derivative is negative, the
quantity of emissions credits earned will ceteris paribus increase with decreasing level of the
underlying economic activity. The same affect would apply to projects in a cap-and-
allowances trading systems which by definition involve allocations of absolute amounts of
emissions permits.
In the case of baselines defined in relative terms, the amount of emissions credits earned by a
JI/CDM project is defined as
( )
relativebpp
tttt EPeex =-￿ . (0.4)
where
relative
t EP   are the emissions credits earned in period  t in case the baseline
is defined in relative terms, e.g. tonnes of CO2 per kilowatt-hour.
The project earns emissions credits if actual project emissions rates are lower than baseline
emissions rates. Taking the first derivative with respect to the actual level of the project’s
economic activity, one finds that the amount of emissions credits earned will increase with
increasing product output, et vice versa. This is a most interesting result because it is
diametrically different from the case where baselines are defined in absolute terms. From an
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environmental perspective it means that the more product output is produced, the more credits
are earned and exported, even if total absolute emissions of the project may be increasing. For
a JI host country this could imply that it may get out of compliance if the product output
increases beyond a critical value which depends on the difference between the baseline
emissions rate and the actual project emissions rate.
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So far, international rules and guidelines on baseline determination of JI/CDM projects
provide little guidance regarding the issue of relative emissions baselines versus absolute
emissions baselines. The previous discussion has made evident that both approaches have
diametrically different implications regarding investment risks and environmental
effectiveness. Thus it would be desirable that rules and guidelines address this fundamental
issue.
An additional risk factor is the conversion of non-CO2 GHGs into CO2 equivalents (CO2e). If
the project in question involves other than CO2 emissions, then the effect of reductions in non-
CO2 GHG needs to be compared relative to reductions in CO2 emissions. This is done by
converting the non-CO2 GHGs into CO2e by means of the global warming potentials of the
different GHGs as provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Second
Assessment Report, based on the effects of the GHGs over a 100-year time horizon. GHG
conversion factors may change during the lifetime of JI/CDM projects, thus affecting the
quantity of emissions credits earned.
As regards the price component of the revenue side, future prices of emissions permits are
quite uncertain. Nonetheless, some practical experience has already been gained. Some
companies have already entered into option contracts for the first commitment period. The
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund aims for a portfolio price outcome of $5.5/tCO2e at the
termination of the fund in 2012 [PCF (2000a)]. The public tender of the Dutch government
for procurement of emissions permits earned from JI projects discovered prices from 5 to 9
EUR/tCO2e.
On the theoretical side, several economic models have tried to estimate market prices for the
first commitment period (see section 3). On average, the models surveyed predict a price of
approximately $9 (1998)/tCO2e in a global trading regime. If rules for the CDM are very
restrictive this value is much higher, corresponding to $22 (1998)/tCO2e. However, in both
scenarios estimated prices vary widely.
Cost side
Costs of JI/CDM projects are composed of GHG emissions abatement or mitigation costs and
transaction costs involved. Abatement costs may be calculated by applying the concept of
incremental costs [Parkinson et al. (2001)]. Incremental costs are the difference between the
costs of the baseline project and the JI/CDM project. Abatement costs will depend on the
concrete technology and the plant location. They involve investment costs, operating and
maintenance costs, fuel costs and other variable costs. All abatement cost components are
affected by uncertainties.
In addition to abatement costs, one needs to consider transaction costs, which are costs
associated with carrying out transactions. Along the JI/CDM project cycle, a wide variety of
different transaction costs may arise which often are uncertain ex ante.
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Further risk source of JI and CDM investments
Further JI/CDM investment risks comprise the following [Janssen (2001)]:
§  Uncertain crediting lifetime: The crediting lifetime T  in the NPV formula of JI/CDM
projects is the length of time emissions credits can accrue. This may be uncertain both in
the case of JI and CDM.
§  Discount rates are uncertain due to financial risks in capital markets.
5.1.3 Risk Management through Risk Diversification
This subsection examines how JI/CDM investment risks may be managed through risk
diversification. It first explains the basic economics of risk diversification. Then it discusses
how JI/CDM risks as identified in the previous subsection may be diversified.
Basic economics of risk diversification
Risk diversification is a fundamental notion in modern financial economics. It is the basis of
portfolio theory and modern capital market theory. Risk diversification means that investment
risks may be reduced by investing a given investment budget into different assets instead of
just one. At its core, risk diversification is based on a simple statistical relation, which implies
that the risk of a portfolio of assets is less than the sum of the risks of individual assets, unless
they are perfectly positively correlated. This can be seen by the following formula, which
describes the risk of a portfolio as measured by the variance of the expected portfolio return:
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where
2
P s   is the variance of a portfolio consisting of N assets,
2
j s   is the variance of the return of asset j,
j a is the portion of asset j in the portfolio and
, jk s   is the covariance of the returns between asset j and asset k.
The first term is the sum of the variances of the single assets, whereas the second term is the
sum of terms describing the covariance between any pair of single assets. The covariance is a
statistical measure of the relationship between two random variables. That is, it gives
information on how two random variables, here uncertain returns, move together. A positive
value for covariance indicates that the realisation of random variables tends to move in the
same direction. For example, a better-than-expected value for the first random variable is
likely to occur with a better-than-expected value for the second random variable. A negative
covariance indicates a tendency for the realisation of two random variables to offset one
another. A zero covariance indicates that there is no relationship between the realisations for
two random variables.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Investors are interested in both risk and expected return. So, how will diversification affect
expected return? Expected return of a portfolio of assets is defined as
( ) ( )
1
N
Pjj
j
ErEr a
=
=￿ (0.6)
where
( ) p Er is the expected return of a portfolio of N assets and
( ) j Er denotes the expected return of asset j.
As can be seen easily, the expected return of the portfolio is just the sum of the expected
returns of single assets in the portfolio, weighted by their portion in the portfolio.
To illustrate the potential of diversification, assume that there are two assets described by the
following statistical qualities:
11221;2 0.05;0.3;0.1;0.4;0.012 msmss ===== (0.7)
If both assets are held in the portfolio in equal portions  [ ] 12 0.5 aa == , then the
portfolio’s expected return and risk are  0.075 P m =  and  0.26 P s = , respectively. A
rational risk-avers investor would clearly prefer this portfolio over the asset 1, because it has a
lower risk and a higher expected return (see Figure 5-1). Comparing asset 2 and the portfolio,
none is superior with respect to the other. Thus the choice between asset 2 and the portfolio
will depend on the investor’s specific preferences.
It is also possible to construct other portfolios characterised by different combinations of asset
1 and asset 2. The dots in Figure 5-1 depicts the risk-return profile of portfolios in which the
portion of asset 1 is reduced in steps of 10% (thus the portion of asset 2 being increased in
steps of 10%). Drawing a line between those points one obtains the set of all feasible
portfolios that may be constructed by combining asset 1 and asset 2 in any portion.
Which combinations are efficient? In the present context, a portfolio is efficient if there is no
other portfolio that has a higher return for a given risk, or that involves a lower risk at a given
return. It is evident that all portfolios on the line between the points MV and asset 1 are
inefficient, because for a given risk a higher return may be achieved by investing in portfolios
that lie on the upper part of the curve. Only those portfolios are efficient that lie on the upper
half of the hyperbola, here on the curve between points MV and asset 2. Point MV is the
efficient portfolio with minimum variance.JOSEF JANSSEN
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Figure 5-1: Simple portfolio of two assets
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Risk diversification of JI and CDM investments
What does the previous discussion on basic portfolio theory imply for risk diversification of
investment risks associated with JI/CDM projects?
First, standard statistical information required for portfolio construction, i.e. asset prices, is
not available for JI/CDM projects since there are not yet any JI/CDM projects implemented.
One could argue that some experience has already been gained in the JI/CDM pilot phase
‘Activities Implemented Jointly’, and that quite a lot of projects that potentially could qualify
as JI/CDM projects, including renewable energy projects, have already been implemented.
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Though, the relevant asset price data are not available, at least not explicitly, and will
probably never be available, even if hundreds or thousands of CDM and JI projects will be
implemented in the next decade or so.
Why? It is most important to note that the previous discussion has analysed the construction
of portfolios of financial assets or securities like stocks or bonds that are publicly traded on
(organised) markets or exchanges. This means that there is plenty of information available on
asset prices. In contrast, financial assets of JI/CDM projects, or existing projects that
potentially may qualify as JI/CDM projects, are not publicly traded. In the real world, only
shares of whole companies are traded publicly, but not the shares of single projects that are
under legal and economic control of a particular firm. Even in off balance sheet or project
finance where single projects like power plants are legally and economically independent
from sponsor companies, shares are not publicly traded. Thus it is difficult to imagine that
equity shares in JI/CDM projects will be securitised.
Against these observations, one might raise a question about the value of portfolio theory for
JI/CDM investments. To answer this question, it is helpful to consider the following points:
First, portfolio theory does not depend per se on the existence of markets on which financial
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assets are traded. Portfolio theory is about selecting between assets of different risk-return
profile. The existence of markets for those assets that are considered for inclusion into the
portfolio would facilitate decision making. Second, there exist approaches that allow one to
make the necessary statistical estimates by using fundamental data of the company or project
in question instead of historical data generated on markets. Third, one could take advantage of
experiences gained with another asset class that is not publicly traded, namely real estate.
Since single real estates are unsecuritised as may be expected from assets of JI/CDM projects,
experience gained from management of real estate portfolios in the form of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) may provide some guidance in the present context.
What insights might be gained? First, regarding methodology it is constructive to understand
how relevant data are being estimated for unsecuritised real estate assets. Indeed, data on
expected returns and respective variances and covariances are usually estimated by means of
fundamental variables like average monthly rent per square meter and vacancy.
Second, it has proved useful to identify as many distinct but homogeneous groups of sub-asset
classifications as possible and to maximise inter-group heterogeneity. In the context of real
estate, the following groups of sub-asset classifications have been proved to result in
significant risk diversification effects among different groups [Seiler, Webb and Myer
(1999)]:
§  Property type, e.g. offices, retail, warehouse, apartments,
§  city and geographic and economic regions,
§  property size and
§  urban versus suburban real estate.
In this context, (empirical) research has been directed towards the question of which
classification yields higher diversification effects, in part leading to ambiguous results.
What insights can be gained from real estate portfolio construction for JI/CDM
diversification? First, risk correlation coefficients may be calculated by means of some
fundamentals of JI/CDM projects. Second, it could be useful to identify sub-classes of
JI/CDM projects with different qualities in order to explore which categories exhibit highest
risk diversification potential.
Recalling the results of the previous discussion on risk identification of JI/CDM investments,
one remembers that two main risk categories affect the return on JI/CDM investments: Price
uncertainties and quantity risks. The latter may stem from uncertain baseline and project
emissions. Is there any diversification potential associated with these risks?
50
To examine this question it is useful to define different categories of JI/CDM projects. It is
then possible to discuss if risks may be diversified across different groups of a given category.
In the following, price risks are not being discussed, but quantity risks only.
In the following, two asset categories will be discussed for illustration, though some
additional categories have proved promising for risk diversification [Janssen (2001)]:
¤  Type of Kyoto Mechanism: JI or CDM (or commercial climate protection projects under a
cap-and-allowance trading system)
¤  Type of sector:
                                                                
50 The following discussion will only deal with some issues for illustration. For a more comprehensive
and thorough analysis see Janssen (2001).JOSEF JANSSEN
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•  Energy:
51
•  Fuel combustion in energy industries.
•  Fugitive emissions from coal mining, and production, processing and transport of
oil and natural gas.
•  Industry: Energy-related and process-related emissions associated with production of
cement, lime, soda ash, glass, ammonia, nitric acid, adipic acid, carbide, iron and
steel, ferroalloys, aluminium, pulp and paper.
•  Agriculture: Domestic livestock, rice cultivation, agricultural soils.
•  Land-use change and forestry.
•  Waste: Solid waste disposal on land, wastewater handling, industrial wastewater and
sludge streams, human sewage, waste incineration.
As explored before, quantity risks stem from uncertain baseline emissions and uncertain
actual emissions of a JI/CDM project. Is there any scope for diversifying quantity risks across
different groups of a given category?
Type of Kyoto Mechanism: It is quite conceivable that rules for baseline determination for JI
and CDM projects will differ. In addition, it is possible that rules for baseline determination
of JI and CDM projects may be adjusted at different times and with different consequences.
This assertion is based on the observation that baseline determination in the context of JI is
less controversial regarding the issue whether JI projects lead to additional emissions
reductions due to the fact that total emissions of JI host countries are limited by the Kyoto
targets. If rules for baseline determination differ between JI and CDM, baseline risks may be
diversified across sub-classes of this category.
What is about actual project emissions? They are not affected by the type of Kyoto
Mechanism. Therefore, risks associated with actual project emissions can not be diversified
across different groups in this category.
Type of sector:  Baseline rules may expected to be sector-specific or source-specific.
Consequently, changes in baseline rules may affect different sectors and types of emissions
sources differently, thus not being perfectly positively correlated.
Variations in actual project emissions will clearly depend on the sector in which the JI/CDM
project is realised. As discussed in before, project emissions are generally defined as the
product of the economic activity level and the corresponding emissions factor  ( )
pp
tt ex ￿ ,
e.g. tonnes of cement produced multiplied by tonnes of GHG emissions per tonne of cement.
Emissions factors are rather fixed in the short and medium term. Therefore actual emissions
will strongly depend on the economic activity level 
p
t x . Economic activities are subject to
economy-wide fluctuations of production, or business cycles. However, different economic
activities are not perfectly positively correlated with the general business cycle and with each
other. As a consequence, GHG emissions of different industries in a given country may not be
expected to be perfectly positively correlated. Thus, risks associated with project emissions
levels may be diversified across different industries.
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Investment vehicles for risk diversification and carbon funds in practice
JI/CDM investors can realise diversification potentials in two basic modes. First they can try
to build up on their own an efficiently diversified portfolio of JI/CDM projects through direct
investments inside or outside the company. The latter seems to be reasonable if the investor
operates a sufficiently large number of climate relevant plants. Second, investors interested in
earning emissions permits could invest indirectly in a portfolio of viable climate protection
projects through dedicated investment vehicles offered by financial institutions.
Indirect investment vehicles may generally be called investment funds even if one needs to
remember that in some countries the term ‘fund’ has a legally well defined meaning. Such
funds may be constituted under the law of contract (as common funds managed by
management companies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or under statute (as investment
companies).
In the USA, the Investment Company Act classifies investment companies into unit
investment trusts and managed investment companies:
Unit investment trusts are registered investment companies that buy and hold a relatively
fixed portfolio of stocks, bonds, or other securities. Unit investment trusts have a stated date
for termination. To establish a unit investment trust, a sponsor purchases a specific set of
securities and deposits them with a trustee. Then a number of units known as redeemable trust
certificates are sold to the public. These certificates provide their owners with pro rata
interests in the securities that were deposited with the trustee.
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Managed investment companies:  The assets of a managed investment company are
professionally managed in accordance with the fund’s investment objectives and policies.
They are divided into closed-end and open-end investment companies.
§  Closed-end investment companies are normally established with a fixed capital. A close-
end fund is not obliged to redeem issued shares at the request of the shareholder and
typically do offer its shares for sale for a limited period only. Because a close-end fund is
not obliged to redeem issued shares, it may invest in less liquid portfolio assets.
§  Open-end investment companies or mutual funds are funds with variable capital which
can continually issue new units but which must also redeem the units issued upon request
at their net asset value.
In the following, I will give a brief description of some emerging carbon funds, including the
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund on which extensive information material is publicly
available. These case studies show how carbon funds could be designed in practice.
The following carbon funds have been launched:
§  World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund,
§  Dexia-FondElec Energy Efficiency and Emissions Reduction Fund,
§  Clean Energy Fund sponsored by D&B Capital and
§  Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund initiated by the International Finance
Corporation.
Other financial institutions including Credit Lyonnais and UBS have announced plans to
launch indirect investment vehicles aimed at generating GHG emissions permits [Cooper
                                                                
52 In some countries like the United Kingdom the term unit trust refers to an open-end investment
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(2000b) and Grice (1999)]. Recently, UBS has withdrawn its commitment. There also exist
some renewable energy funds including Merrill Lynch’s New Energy Technology Fund. So
far, these funds have not announced any intentions to capture directly the value of GHG
emissions permits.
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF): The establishment of the PCF was approved
by the World Bank in July 1999. Its operations formally started in April 2000. The PCF is the
first indirect investment vehicle whose explicit purpose is to earn GHG emissions permits
through JI and CDM projects [IBRD (1999); PCF (2000a)].
The PCF will use the fund resources to support prospective JI and CDM projects. In return,
fund investors will receive a pro rata share of the emissions reductions.
53 The PCF is
established as a trust fund of the IBRD, not as a partnership or corporation as other carbon
funds (see below). The maximum size of the fund is restricted to $180 million. After its
second closing at the end of 2000, it has attracted investments equal to $145 million. The PCF
is scheduled to terminate in 2012.
In the present context it is interesting to note that the PCF is the sole carbon fund that has
established and made publicly available its portfolio selection criteria. They encompass the
following criteria:
§  Broad balance between JI projects in countries with economies in transition and CDM
projects.
§  Major emphasis on projects in the area of renewable energy technology such as, but not
limited to, geothermal, wind, solar and small-scale hydro energy.
§  No less than approximately 2% and not more than 10% of the PCF’s assets should be
invested in any one project.
§  No more than approximately 20% of the fund’s asset will be invested in projects in the
same host country.
§  No more than approximately 10% of the fund’s assets should be invested in land-use
projects. Unless the Parties to the UNFCCC do not decided positively about the eligibility
of land-use, land-use change and forestry projects under the CDM, no such project shall
be located in a non-Annex I country.
§  No more than approximately 25% of the fund’s assets should be invested in projects using
the same technology.
Originally, the PCF was conceived as an investment vehicle. At early implementation stage,
the PCF’s structure was changed. Under the new structure, its function is one of purchasing
emissions reductions and credits, as opposed to conventional project finance with investments
in specific project components or activities [PCF (2000a)]. Since purchase agreements such as
power purchase agreements do not involve investment risks but rather contract default risks,
one may wonder whether there is still any scope for or benefit from portfolio construction.
54
                                                                
53 Investors or participants in the PCF are the governments of Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the following private sector companies:
Electrabel (Belgium), Fortum (Finland), Gaz de France (France), Deutsche Bank and RWE
(Germany), Chubu Electric Power Co., Chugoku Electric Power Co., Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui, Shikoku Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co., Tokyo Electric Power Co.
(all from Japan), RaboBank (Netherlands), Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway), and BP (UK).
54 Emissions reduction purchase agreements may be quite similar to power purchase agreements
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To answer this question it is instructive to have a closer look at the emissions reduction
purchase agreement (ERPA) related to the PCF’s first project [PCF (2000b)].
This project aims at generating GHG emissions reductions through maximum collection and
utilisation of landfill gas in Liepaja City and Liepaja Region in Latvia. The ERPA is entered
into by the IBRD and the Republic of Latvia. It stipulates that the host country delivers a
minimum amount of emissions reductions to the PCF. The total minimum amount is equal to
105,800 metric tonnes of carbon equivalents. Annual minimum deliveries are also specified.
In addition to the minimum emissions reductions, the PCF receives 50% of all additional
emissions reductions earned by the project, provided that the average market price for
emissions reductions applicable to the period for which any such additional emissions
reductions are being delivered is not above $6.80 /tCO2e. In case the market price exceeds
this value, the percentage is reduced as a function of the market price. At a minimum, the PCF
receives 25% of the additional emissions reductions, namely at a market price of over $25.90
/tCO2e.
The PCF pays to the host country a total of $2,477 million. Disbursements occur as an
advanced payment, in five intermediate payments upon the achievement by the project of
certain specified milestones, and a final payment.
Coming back to the point of departure of this case study, it is evident that such a kind of
purchase agreement clearly shows qualities of a risky investment, even if the time profile of
cash flows deviates from the one typical observed in common project investments.
First, the ERPA foresees that any additional emissions reductions above a well defined
minimum level are to be shared. By its nature, ex ante the amount of additional or residual
emissions reductions is uncertain to both parties. It may be presumed that the PCF had
expectations about the amount of additional emissions reductions when negotiating the
financial terms of the purchase agreement. However, the amount of additional emissions
reductions that will actually be generated is highly uncertain. The risk associated with the
residuum ‘additional emissions reductions’ definitely goes beyond the delivery risk associated
with the minimum amount of emissions reductions, and resembles the risk associated with
equity capital investments.
Second, the purchase agreement may be regarded as a form of investment beyond the agreed
advance payment. This is because part of the PCF’s assets are already now being allocated to
a particular future use, and are tied to that use. If future project developments prove
unfavourable, thus diminishing the prospects for additional emissions reductions, the PCF
will face difficulties in withdrawing its commitment.
In conclusion, to minimise the risks associated with the additional emissions reductions it
makes perfect sense to take advantage of risk diversification techniques as indicated by
portfolio theory and as discussed above.
Compared to the PCF, there is much less information available on the other indirect carbon
investment vehicles. Since they are different in certain aspects with respect to the PCF, it is
worthwhile mentioning some of their features.
Dexia-FondElec Energy Efficiency and Emissions Reduction Fund: This closed-end
equity fund was originated and sponsored by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and Dexia Group, a Franco-Belgian banking group. It will make
investments that improve the energy efficiency of existing plant and equipment, including
investments in generating plant retrofits and fuel conversions, heat recovery systems, electric
transmission grids, gas and district heating system improvements, illumination, and industrial
energy efficiency enhancements.JOSEF JANSSEN
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The fund aims at raising 100 to 150 million EUR and will invest primarily in the countries of
central and eastern Europe. The EBRD and Dexia have each committed 20 million EUR. In
addition, the fund has already attracted several other investors, including Marubeni
Corporation, Kansai Electric Power Co., Electric Power Development Corporation and Mitsui
& Co. Europe Limited. Investors will earn equity return and emissions permits. It is intended
to establish a number of energy service companies (ESCOs) to assist the fund in the
acquisition and disposition of projects. Fund manager is FondElec Group, a private equity
fund management firm. The fund is a closed-end equity investment fund and is structured as a
ten-year limited liability partnership with domicile in the Cayman Islands.
Clean Energy Fund: This private equity fund is sponsored by D&B Capital. and will invest
in sustainable energy projects worldwide. It aims to refinance and restructure existing fossil
fuel power plants in order to make them more environmentally friendly. In addition, the fund
will finance new power generation projects using renewable energy including hydro, tidal,
wind, solar, geothermal and biomass. Completed projects will be sold to third parties. The
fund is structured as a 10-year limited liability partnership with domicile in Bermuda. The
fund aims at raising $100 million and, besides common equity return, the fund also expects to
generate GHG emissions permits from some of its investments [Cooper (2000a)].
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund: This private debt and equity fund was
initiated by the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank.
It aims at raising $100 million and will also be able to draw on a $100 million debt facility.
Equity investors in the fund are among others private-sector utilities and financial institutions.
Besides normal returns, the fund will also try to capture the financial value of emissions
permits that might be generated by the fund’s investment projects [Cooper (2000c)].
5.2 Insurance
Very recently, some insurance companies like Swiss Re, Gerling, Jardine Lloyd Thompson or
Aon have been showing growing interest in providing risk management tools tailored at the
needs of prospective users of the Kyoto Mechanisms and GHG emissions trading. Indeed, it
might be expected that insurance companies will have a role to play in managing risks
associated with the Kyoto Mechanisms and GHG emissions trading. The aim of this
subsection is to discuss the relevance of insurance for managing risks associated with JI/CDM
projects.
To this end, it is organised as follows: First, it discusses insurability of risks. It is a frequent
misperception that any kind of risk may be managed through insurance. To be able to apply
insurance mechanisms, the risks to be insured need to exhibit certain features. This analysis is
then applied to explore if specific risks associated with JI/CDM investments may be managed
by insurance.
Like stock markets, insurance is also a way for society to share risk. Insurance mechanisms
aim at reducing uncertainty for a group as a whole through the pooling of risks that exhibit
certain probabilistic features. The risk that an insurance company faces is not merely a
summation of the risks transferred to it by individuals or firms. Instead, insurance companies
may achieve risk reduction due to the law of large numbers.
The strong law of large numbers states that the arithmetic average of the realisations of
independent and identically distributed random variables tends towards the expected value or
mean as the number of random variables becomes very large. This means that the standard
deviation of the expected arithmetic average converges towards zero. In other words, the
average value is much less uncertain than the individual realisation of a random variable.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
41
In the context of insurance the law of large number implies that the average loss in an
insurance pool will become more certain as more independent and identically distributed
exposure units are added to the pool. Figure 5-2 shows that the probability that the average
loss will equal the expected loss becomes greater as the number of exposure units  ( ) N
increases. Indeed, the risk per exposure unit in an insurance pool, i.e. the standard deviation of
the average loss, will converge towards zero as the number of exposure units becomes very
large. This is shown by Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-2: Average Loss Distribution with Different Number of Exposure Units
Average loss
Probability density
N=10
N=1000
N=100
Expected average loss
Figure 5-3: Risk per Policy as Function of Number of Exposure Units
Number of exposure units
Risk per policy
( ) LN s
This observation on the basic mechanics of insurance leads to the issue of insurability of risks.
In contrast to frequent perception, not all risks are insurable. In the insurance literature and
practice, the issue of insurability of risks has attracted major interest [Faure (1995); HolsboerJOSEF JANSSEN
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(1995); Karten (1997); Vermaat (1995)]. A standard reference on insurability criteria is
Berliner (1982), a Swiss Re executive. He has proposed to check insurability of risks
according to the following criteria:
(1)  Losses occur with a high degree of randomness,
(2)  the maximum possible loss is very limited,
(3)  the average loss amount upon loss occurrence is small,
(4)  the average time interval between loss occurrences is short, losses occur frequently,
(5)  the insurance premium willing to be paid for the coverage is high enough,
(6)  there is a low possibility of moral hazard,
(7)  coverage of the risk is consistent with public policy and
(8)  the law permits the coverage.
Conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4) concern actuarial issues. Together with conditions (5) they
basically enable the application of risk pooling mechanisms by the law of large numbers.
Condition (6) is critical from an economic perspective. The last two conditions involve
political considerations.
From an economic perspective, the question of insurability is closely linked to the issue of
moral hazard and adverse selection. Both problems are caused by asymmetric information
between the insurer and the insured.
Considering that not all risks are insurable, then which risks associated with JI/CDM
investments may be covered by insurance? This question comes at the very beginning of any
analysis of JI/CDM insurance.
Based on the general criteria of insurability as mentioned above, it is possible to explore
which of the specific JI/CDM risks may possibly be covered by insurance in the future.
Recalling the results of the previous sub-section, the following main risk sources will affect
the value of JI/CDM investments:
¤  Uncertain baselines due to uncertain rules and guidelines,
¤  uncertain crediting lifetime due to uncertain rules,
¤  uncertain emissions factors due to
•  uncertain rules and guidelines and
•  uncertain fuel prices,
¤  uncertain level of economic activity due to
•  uncertain product demand and
•  uncertain technological performance of production plants or breakdown of
machinery,
¤  uncertain GHG conversion factors,
¤  uncertain permit prices, and
¤  uncertain abatement and transaction cots.KYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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Obviously, JI/CDM projects involve also other risks that are common to any conventional
project. For some of those risks insurance exists. But since they are not specifically related to
JI/CDM projects they are not dealt with here.
As discussed above, a fundamental requirement for insurance is that the insurance company
can pool a large number of independent and identically distributed events that give rise to a
loss. Thus a necessary condition for insurability of JI/CDM investment risks is that respective
risk sources approximately exhibit this statistical quality.
Many of the aforementioned risks may probably not be covered by insurance [Janssen
(2001)]. However, some risks appear to be quite promising for insurance.
To give an example, actual project emissions levels as one component of the quantity of
emissions credits earned are determined by both emissions factors and the level of economic
activity. As explained before, activity level risks are either due to uncertain product demand
or to uncertain technological performance or breakdown of production plants and machinery.
Uncertain market demand is a typical market risk for which no insurance is available since it
affects all agents operating in that market.
The latter risk source may be covered by business interruption insurance.
55 Business
interruption insurance indemnifies companies for loss of income during the period required to
restore property damaged by an insured peril. Most business interruption insurance policies
provide compensation for loss of operating profits and for any fixed costs insured that can not
be reduced if a business interruption occurs. Business interruption insurance is a form of
consequential or indirect loss coverage.
What does this imply in the present context? First, net revenues from production and sale of
emissions credits is part of the operating profit of JI/CDM projects. Second, if the baseline of
a JI/CDM project is defined as emissions rate relative to the activity level, then business
interruption implies a drop or loss of production of both the company’s primary product and
emissions credits. Loss in operating profits due to a loss of production of the primary product
is covered by conventional business interruption insurance. It would be straightforward to
extend such coverage also to additional operating profits earned by the sale of emissions
credits that are generated by JI/CDM projects.
Statistical data on the frequency of loss occurrence are readily available from traditional
business interruption insurance. Additional operating profits earned from the JI/CDM project
component may be estimated with the help of data on current and projected permit quantities
and prices. As in the case of conventional business interruption insurance, the JI/CDM
coverage must specify the insured peril. In this regard, two basic options exist: named perils
and all risks covers. With the former the property is only insured against explicitly named and
listed events. With all risks cover, all losses are covered that arise from direct and
unforeseeable causes as long as they have not been explicitly excluded from the policy.
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6. Conclusions
The Marrakech Accords agreed upon at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP7) in
November 2001 pave the way for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union
strives for the Protocol’s entry into for force by the end of 2002. This will be possible despite
the persisting reluctance of the USA to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, if the two pivotal countries
Japan and Russia ratify the Kyoto Protocol as promised.
Both, domestic and international emissions trading will play a key role in national climate
policies designed to meet a country’s Kyoto target. In Europe, Denmark has already
established a system of tradable carbon dioxide permits for its power sector. The UK will
launch its comprehensive emissions trading system in the beginning of 2002. And in October
2001, the European Commission has released a proposal for a EU-wide trading system to start
by 2005. This system would cover around 40% of its projected GHG emissions in the first
commitment period and would involve a large number of different sectors.
International transactions of emissions permits will be governed by one of the three Kyoto
Mechanisms. Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading (IET), as
respectively established by the Articles 6 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, enable international
transactions of emissions permits among Annex B countries. The Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), as defined by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows developing
countries, i.e. non-Annex B countries, to earn emissions permits and to sell them to Annex B
countries.
The distinguishing difference between JI and IET is that the former involves project-based or
baseline-and-credit trading, whereas the latter encompasses inventory-based or cap-and-
allowance trading. If governments wish to implement a mix of different climate policies, thus
not relying exclusively on cap-and-allowance trading, the two trading systems will co-exist.
In this case, inventory-based emissions trading may be complemented by project-based
emissions trading for those emissions sources and GHGs that are not regulated by cap-and-
allowance trading, but other policy instruments like energy efficiency standards or negotiated
environmental agreements (see chapter II on the latter).
In contrast to a frequent misperception, from a regulatory perspective JI and CDM projects do
not necessarily require international investments. Host countries may expected to implement
the largest number of JI and CDM projects unilaterally, as is the case with common economic
activities. The Kyoto Protocol, as put in concrete terms through the Marrakech Accords,
would not prevent them from doing so.
When exploring opportunities and barriers associated with the Kyoto Mechanisms, it is useful
to distinguish between demand and supply side. Opportunities on the demand side of GHG
markets mainly involve significantly lower costs of compliance for industries that are
regulated by climate policies. On the supply side, companies with comparatively low
abatement costs may benefit from emissions trading and the Flexible Mechanisms by
marketing emissions permits, thus making additional profits.
Main barriers that prevent companies to take advantage of GHG emissions trading and the
Flexible Mechanisms include market risks and regulatory barriers at the international and
national level.
Important market risks are permit price uncertainties and liquidity risks. Regulatory barriers
induced by international rules include levies on transactions, eligibility requirements for
countries and transaction costs caused by the modalities and procedures as stipulated by the
Marrakech Accords. At the national level, low compatibility of domestic climate policyKYOTO FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS
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regulations with the Flexible Mechanisms and lack of incentives for legal entities to engage in
the Flexible Mechanisms may represent major barriers.
Price risks may be managed through derivatives. In contrast, regulatory barriers need to be
removed through appropriate design of climate policies and regulations. In particular,
governments need to provide incentives for companies to use the Flexible Mechanisms for
compliance. To this end, companies that apply the Flexible Mechanisms need to get relief
from domestic climate policy regulations in a corresponding amount. Transparent and stable
regulations governing the Kyoto Mechanisms are essential for their use by the private sector.
Financing and risk management are important functions performed by financial institutions
such as banks and insurance companies. The supply of optimised financial products and
services is essential for the efficiency of markets. Emerging GHG markets represent
challenging new opportunities for financial institutions to supply innovative financial
products and services that are tailored at the needs of market participants. Areas that appear to
be particularly interesting include project finance, derivatives related to GHG markets, carbon
funds and insurance.
In the past, the role of financial institutions in contributing to implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Kyoto Mechanisms has rarely been explored. Discussion has predominantly
been directed towards the question of how climate change might impact financial institutions,
and of how financial institutions could adapt to climate change impacts.
In advance of the academic debate, several major financial institutions like Deutsche Bank
and SwissRe, among others, are already designing new financial products and services
targeted at the needs of corporate clients that wish to take advantage of the Kyoto
Mechanisms and GHG emissions trading. This chapter has explored some aspects of carbon
investment funds and insurance related to JI and CDM projects.
Not all risks are insurable. Indeed, the role of commercial insurance for managing specific
risks of JI and CDM projects is limited since many risks are regulatory or market risks which
are difficult to cover by classical insurance. A promising area may be business interruption
insurance to cover the loss of income associated with the generation of emissions permits.
Carbon investment funds have the potential to diversify away some risks associated with
investments in abatement activities that aim at resulting in marketable emissions permits.
Such funds may be set up and managed by investment banks and other financial institutions.
Indeed, some carbon funds such as the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund are already
emerging in reality.
Concluding, the Kyoto Protocol has established the basis for nascent national and
international markets for GHG emissions reductions and permits. These markets, whose size
is estimated to amount to several $10 billion annually, will offer challenging opportunities to
a wide variety of different players in industry and business. Financial institutions may benefit
from providing new and optimised financial products and services that increase efficiency of
GHG markets.JOSEF JANSSEN
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